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The Cultural Defense: Reflections in
Light of the Model Penal Code and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Kent Greenawalt*
I. INTRODUCTION

I wrote this essay after participating in a 2006 workshop on Criminal Law and
Cultural Diversity, 1which discussed, among other subjects, the wisdom of providing a
"cultural defense." Uncertain just how far such a defense might expand on defenses
already available, I undertook to explore that topic.
The phrase "a cultural defense" suggests an either/or choice that any legal system
might make. That matters are much more complex than this is part of the burden of
this essay. A "cultural defense" in its most general sense refers to a wide range of
ways in which evidence about a defendant's cultural upbringing or practices could
influence legal judgment about his guilt or responsibility. So understood, the phrase
could refer not only to a general, separate defense labeled a "cultural defense," but
also claims about culture that either are relevant under standard defenses in the
criminal law, such as duress and provocation, or could be relevant were those
traditional defenses expanded in some way.
Much of this essay is an inquiry into just how cultural factors might figure in
claims about elements of offenses, justifications, excuses, and mitigations under the
Model Penal Code-still the most comprehensive and systematic code of criminal law
in the United States. That exploration gives us a sense of how culture may matter for
criminal liability absent a specifically labeled "cultural defense"; it also provides an
idea of how much could be accomplished by expansions of the standard defenses.
In the latter part of the essay, I think about cultural practices as a potential
justification or generalized exemption in advance, comparing such a defense with an
analogous defense based on religious belief and practice that now exists in many
American jurisdictions.

* University Professor, Columbia University. I have benefited greatly from suggestions from
Melvin Eisenberg, Claes Lemestedt, and Samuel Scheffler. The copyright to this essay is held by Oxford
University Press.
1 Criminal Law and Cultural Diversity Workshop, held at Columbia Law School, March 10-11,
2006, co-sponsored by the Columbia University Center for Law and Philosophy and the Forum for
Philosophy and Public Policy of Queen's University, and led by Will Kymlicka, Claes Lemestedt, and
Jeremy Waldron. Revised versions of the conference papers, as well as this essay, are to be published by
Oxford University Press in 2009, edited by Professors Kymlicka, Lerestedt, and Waldron, under the title
of CriminalLaw and CulturalDiversity.
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II. DRAWING SOME IMPORTANT DISTINCTIONS

If one understands a "cultural defense" as a general defense that is labeled as
such and that reaches beyond more traditional, standard defenses as they now are
formulated, or as they could comfortably be revised, one needs to situate a cultural
defense among a range of possibilities and approaches. Whether having a specific
cultural defense makes good sense depends greatly on whether other responses to
cultural traditions and assumptions meet whatever needs there may be for
accommodation and fairness.
A. A CulturalDefense in Criminal Law Versus Other Forms ofAccommodation
Outside the CriminalLaw

A cultural defense concerns the criminal law. There are many other ways in
which cultural traditions and practices may be accommodated. Allowing for the use
of a cultural defense in the criminal law is sometimes described as an example of
"multiculturalism," and it is often assumed that people's positions in respect to a
cultural defense follow from their more general attitudes towards accommodating
cultural diversity outside the criminal law. However, we should not conflate debates
about the cultural defense with broader debates about multicultural accommodations,
since the criminal law is unique in many ways.
On the one hand, there may be reasons why people who support multiculturalism
in general would not support the cultural defense. Someone might think that society
has an obligation to accommodate the cultural practices of minorities even when these
impose some cost or inconvenience on society, but no corresponding obligation to
accommodate practices when they impose harm. On this view, there might be an
obligation to adapt the workplace to accommodate a minority's group holidays,
traditional dress, or cuisine, or to publicly fund a minority group's cultural activities,
but no obligation to allow defendants to invoke culture as a defense for conduct that
has harmed other people.
On the other hand, there might be reasons why people who oppose
multiculturalism in general might nonetheless support greater scope for evidence of
cultural norms in criminal cases. Given that the criminal law has the potential to
deprive individuals of their life and liberty, one might think that the perspectives of
defendants should matter to a degree that they do not even for civil damages, as to
which the fair expectations of those who are injured should control. Perhaps criminal
defendants should be allowed every opportunity to demonstrate that they are not
appropriately held blameworthy or responsible, even if one does not agree that the
state generally has any duty to fund or accommodate cultural practices in, say, the
schools or public media. The cultural defense in criminal law must be assessed on its
own terms.
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B. A CulturalDefense Versus Choices Not to CriminalizeBehavior

If a person's behavior is not covered by the law of crimes in the first place, he
obviously does not need a defense. Suppose that a small ethnic minority in a country
engages in a traditional practice that would violate a law that legislators are
considering: Sikh men cannot wear motorcycle helmets because their cultural practice
requires that they wear turbans; the traditional life of the Inuit depends upon killing a
limited number of a protected species of whales. Legislators may respond by
declining to adopt the general restriction, e.g., allowing everyone to ride motorcycles
without helmets, or by exempting members of a particular cultural group from a
mandate that applies to everyone else, what we may call the exemption strategy. As I
shall explore in more detail in the last part of this paper, I assume that the exemption
strategy is sometimes justified. Any need for a general cultural defense depends
partly on the legislature not having achieved all the desirable accommodations to
cultural practices (such as riding without helmets) by leaving activities free of any
regulation or through specific exemptions.
C. A CulturalDefense Versus JurisdictionalAllocation

One way in which the legal system can accommodate minority cultures is to
grant them jurisdiction to regulate their own affairs in certain respects. Some
countries assign matters of marriage and divorce to various religious groups. This is
not done in the United States, although general principles allowing private arbitration
permit members of religious and cultural groups who have civil disputes to choose
arbitrators from their own traditions.
Native American tribes are given jurisdiction over minor criminal matters within
their reservations. That assignment rests on a legal notion that the tribes are semisovereign, but the strategy ofjurisdictional autonomy could be followed with respect
to other cultural minorities, although any such scheme faces arguments by victims
about their constitutional rights. That is a very different approach from creating
defenses within the ordinary criminal law, and it is not a promising approach for
serious crimes like murder and rape.
D. Substantive Liability Versus Sentencing

Many factors count for sentencing that are not relevant for underlying criminal
liability. One might think that the right place to consider diverse cultural influences is
in sentencing, not the substantive criminal law. The plausibility of this position rests
significantly on how much sentencing discretion judges enjoy. If their choices are
tightly circumscribed according to a range of considerations that omit cultural
influences, then judges imposing sentences will be unable to give much weight to
cultural factors. Even ifjudges have broad discretion, there are two strong reasons not
to remit everything to sentencing.
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The first is that even a light sentence is misguided if the proper response to
someone's behavior is that he committed no wrong. The second is that ifjudges have
wide sentencing discretion (and there is not extensive review of sentences by appellate
courts), different judges may reach radically different conclusions about the relevance
of cultural traditions. (The concern about differential treatment will follow us in the
rest of this essay.)
E. Alleviation in the Application of the Substantive Law Versus Nullification

Juries (and judges) can refuse to apply the applicable law. Jury nullification
occupies a paradoxical position in American law. Judges do not tell juries they can
nullify, and lawyers have no general right to present facts and arguments that might
lead juries to do so. But the practice of jury nullification is praised as a safeguard of
justice and is protected by constitutional doctrines regarding jury verdicts.2 One
question about cultural influences is whether defendants should have an opportunity to
present such factors if they might lead a jury (or judge) to refuse to follow legal
requirements. I disregard this possibility in what follows and concentrate on how
cultural influences might affect applications of the law, not nullifications of it.
F. Minority Cultures Versus Majority Culture

What counts as culture in the inquiry whether to create a general cultural
defense? Suppose a member of the dominant culture claims that his perspective was
strongly supported by aspects of that culture. Nicola Lacey provides the example of a
young man who believes, according to traditional assumptions (among men) that a
woman who says "no" to sexual intercourse in certain circumstances really means
"yes." 3 Is he to have some kind of defense? Insofar as "culture" figures in the
application of standard defenses, a defendant could rely on how he was affected by the
majority culture, but I am assuming in this essay that a general cultural defense,
labeled as such, would refer to minority cultures. This definitional gambit leaves us
with the questions: even taking into account that the substantive criminal law will
mainly reflect majority values, why should minority cultures get a defense that
members of the majority do not enjoy?; and how should one determine exactly which
minority cultures may benefit from such a defense?
G. A Cultural Defense Versus Aggravation

The assumption underlying the phrase "a cultural defense" is that the connection
to culture will count in favor of a defendant if it counts at all. However, cultural
factors could be introduced against a defendant. This is evident in relation to ordinary
2

See KENT GREENAWALT, CoNFucTs OF LAW AND MoRALrry 360-67 (1987).

Nicola Lacey, Cultureand Criminalization,in CRIMINAL LAW AND CULTURAL DIvERsrrY (Will
Kymlicka, Claes Lemestedt & Jeremy Waldron eds., Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming 2009).
3
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standards of liability. Suppose a defendant claims that he acted on a momentary
impulse. Evidence that according to his cultural traditions, a person in his positionhe is, say, the brother of a woman his victim seduced a month ago-has a
responsibility to kill the victim, could support the prosecution's argument that he
killed after deliberation.
The second way in which cultural factors might work against the defendant is
less obvious and more debatable. Conceivably, evidence that someone was raised in a
Nazi culture and retained its perspectives might make him seem a worse person than
he would otherwise. I am doubtful about the persuasiveness of this illustration. That
someone is a Nazi might well make him seem worse, but a person raised in the
general (non-Nazi) culture who freely chooses Nazism may seem worse to us than
someone raised in a Nazi culture. Thus, the particular claim of continuing connection
to a culture might even here seem to mitigate blameworthiness. In any event, it is at
least possible that cultural influence might make a person seem more, rather than less,
blameworthy. This raises the question whether, were some general reference to
culture to be included in the criminal law, judges and juries should be able to count
culture againstdefendants as well as for them.
H. A GeneralDefense Versus Evidence That Is Relevant to Components ofLiability

The idea of a "cultural defense" sounds like a general defense, something on
which a defendant might rely independent of evidence that would be relevant to
ordinary matters of mens rea, excuse, and justification. Whether a general defense is
needed depends heavily on the adequacy of evidence of cultural factors as parts of
ordinary assessments of criminal wrongdoing.
To investigate that adequacy, we may take the standards of a legal system as they
now exist, as they now exist (or might exist) if debatable open-ended issues are
resolved in favor of admitting cultural factors, or as they would exist with discrete
reforms that fall short of a general defense. My inquiry in Part III proceeds along
these lines in respect to the Model Penal Code.
Were a legal system to employ some general requirement of personal
blameworthiness in addition to all particular requisites of criminal behavior, the
difference between admitting into evidence relevant cultural factors and having a
specific cultural defense would recede in significance.4 In either event, a defendant
could claim that her having acted in accord with her cultural traditions rendered her
not liable or less liable than she would otherwise be. In this essay, I adhere to the
assumption of common law jurisdictions that there is no general defense of lack of
blameworthiness if the prosecution establishes all the specific elements necessary for
a criminal conviction.5
4

One might reach the same conclusion if one thought that the system's ordinary, more particular

standards of criminality included all the bases of personal blameworthiness that might be affected by
cultural factors.
5 The closest approximation of such a general defense is the defense of diminished responsibility
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I. CulturalFactors Versus Other PotentiallyRelevant Factors
A crucial question about both a general cultural defense and evidence of cultural
factors as part of the ordinary criminal process is how cultural factors figure in
relation to other possible factors. If one cannot come up with some reasonably
persuasive distinctions between the kind of cultural factors that would make a
difference and other factors, one must conclude that culture should not count, to put it
crudely, or that other factors should also count.
If we think of cultural tradition as a basis for excuse or mitigation, comparison
with factors such as abusive parents, brain damage, deprived neighborhoods, and
violent "subcultures" (such as gang life) may seem relevant. If we suppose that
cultural tradition might actually supply a justification for behavior that would
otherwise violate the criminal law, we can compare it with standard practices within
the majority culture, such as physical aggression in sports like boxing and ice hockey.
We can also compare the norms of cultural traditions with religious practices and
claims of conscience (religious and nonreligious). Of course, religious practice and
cultural tradition overlap to a considerable degree, but a legal protection of religious
practices does not embrace all cultural practices, and many religious claims do not
attach to minority cultures. Part IV of my essay engages the comparison of cultural
tradition with religion and conscience.
Whether one is focusing on excuse or justification, one must decide what
constitutes a relevant culture. I am assuming in this essay that the protection of a
"cultural defense" would go to minority cultures of an "ethnic" or "national" sort, not
to the subculture of sadists and masochists or gangs within the dominant culture or the
"culture" of particular households or neighborhoods. Were a defense to be cast along
these lines, one would need reasons to favor the kinds of "minority" cultures that
would be included over those that would be excluded.
III. CULTURAL FACTORS AND THE MODEL PENAL CODE:
IS A GENERAL DEFENSE NEEDED AS A SUPPLEMENT?

As we have already explored in a preliminary way, whether a special cultural
defense is needed in American criminal law depends substantially on how cultural
factors might figure in ordinary standards of criminal liability. It is time now to
engage this inquiry about one coherent set of standards, the Model Penal Code.6
A. Why Look at the Model PenalCode?

Some initial words of explanation are needed for those who are not familiar with
the place of the Model Penal Code in American law, and a few further words are
needed about my degree of involvement with its commentary. Within the United
that reduces murder to manslaughter in some jurisdictions.
6

MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES (1985).
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States, principles of criminal law are left to individual states, so we have no criminal
law of the entire country. There is, instead, the criminal law of fifty-three
jurisdictions-the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the federal
jurisdiction. Up through the 1950s, basic principles of criminal law were developed
by occasional judicial decisions and by piecemeal legislation that amounted to much
less than comprehensive codes.
The Model Penal Code project of the American Law Institute was an effort to
rectify this situation, to provide a model for states that was cohesive and
comprehensive, that would clarify some aspects of the law and improve upon aspects
that were irrational or unwise. The bulk of the project was completed in the 1950s
under the leadership of Herbert Wechsler, widely regarded as our country's greatest
criminal law theorist and reformer. The Code became official in 1962, with the
approval of the membership of the Institute. At that point, the major sections we shall
examine had extensive comments that explained their texts and rationales. The
comments for many individual crimes and for sentencing and jurisdictional provisions
were much less fully developed.
In the late 1970s, the Institute received a federal grant to complete the
Commentaries. I was brought into that project as Chief Reporter, but in actuality
under the very active supervision of Professor Wechsler. The aim was to finish
explanatory comments and to trace the influence of the Code up to that time in actual
jurisdictions. Those of us who were working at that stage had no authority to alter the
Code's text (except to change an occasional "which" to "that" and to correct
mispunctuation), and the comments were (for the most part) to continue to explain and
defend what the Code did, not to provide a critical perspective after two decades. We
were free to consider how the Code might apply to phenomena not dealt with in the
original comments.
Most of the sections I shall be discussing are in the General Part, for which I was
responsible at that point in the commentary's revision. On rereading the comments, I
have been struck by their inattention to cultural factors. No doubt, a substantial part
of the explanation was the focus of the drafters on individual psychological
characteristics that could affect culpability, rather than attachments to groups with
traditions and norms that varied from those in the dominant culture. What the
comments say needs to be understood as the thoughtful work of Wechsler and his
collaborators roughly fifty years ago, but the failure to comprehend and consider some
nuances in ways defendants might introduce cultural influences is partially mine.
Why consider the Model Penal Code, now more than forty-five years old? It is
still by far the most systematic and comprehensive approach to a criminal code in the
United States, and although not the law in any jurisdiction, it has been drawn upon
heavily by many states in their revisions of their own penal codes. Its Commentaries
are often relied upon when state courts interpret provisions that are worded similarly
to those of the Code, and even courts in jurisdictions without revised codes sometimes
rely on Code approaches to develop their own law. The Code figures prominently in
many of the casebooks used to teach criminal law to American students. Very
importantly, the Model Penal Code adopts statutory formulations for general
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principles of liability as well as for specific crimes; one need not search patterns of
judicial decisions to try to discern just what counts as duress or necessity. Thus, it is
much easier to say what defendants can or cannot claim.
Were one to carry out the exercise I shall perform for any actual jurisdiction, one
would need to see how far its approaches deviate from those of the Code. In my own
more limited endeavor, I will comment on some aspects of the Code that have not
been widely followed. If one can summarize the overall effect of these differences, it
is that most actual jurisdictions are somewhat less hospitable to the introduction of
cultural factors than is the Model Code itself.
B. Basic Standards of Culpability
Although the Model Penal Code requires an actus reus, i.e., a voluntary act or
omission, and it is conceivable that a defendant might rely on a cultural practice to
claim that he did not meet even the minimal standard of voluntariness, we can move
beyond this possibility and focus on the Code's four standards of culpabilitypurpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. In contrast with vague ideas of
"intention" characteristic of much preceding law, Section 2.02(2)(a)(i) treats purpose
as a "conscious object to engage in conduct" of a defined kind or "to cause such a
result." A has a purpose to kill B only if that is his conscious object.
In a case that raises issues about the relevance of cultural traditions, Kargar
kissed his baby son's penis.7 If the crime charged is defined solely as requiring
contact between a person's mouth and a child's genitals, Kargar had that purpose. If
sexual arousal is an element of the crime, Kargar lacked that purpose. He could
establish his absence of that purpose by pointing to the cultural tradition in
Afghanistan, his country of origin, that fathers kiss the penises of their baby sons.
We can see that cultural practice could count againsta defendant. In a variation
on an illustration that I used previously, if a defendant claims that his fatal striking of
a victim was accidental, evidence that according to his culture, he had a duty to kill
that person could help establish a purpose to kill.
Under the Model Code, a person acts knowingly with regard to a result if he is
"aware that it is practically certain" his conduct will cause it. 8 Thus, a person who
plants a bomb in a car with the purpose of killing one of its occupants knows that it
will with practical certainty kill others whom he realizes will also be in the car.
Cultural factors could be introduced by a defendant to show he was ignorant of causal
consequences other people would take as practically certain, or to show that he was
practically certain of consequences others might take as unlikely.
The standards for both purpose and knowledge are rigorously subjective; 9 they
depend on what an actual defendant aimed to do and understood. Thus, any evidence
7 State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996). Kargar, an Afghani refugee, was convicted of gross
sexual assault.
8 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(b)(ii) (1985).
9

Knowledge does have an objective element as well. Suppose A believes that he has magical
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bearing on a defendant's state of mind in regard to these elements of a crime could be
relevant. No need arises for any special consideration of cultural factors, since they
could be introduced like anything else.
However, we can see that if a crime is defined so that the crucial purpose
depends only upon aiming to perform a certain physical act, one might need a general
defense to exonerate the person whose tradition gives him an unusual, unthreatening
reason to perform that physical act.
Whether a general defense would be needed to exonerate defendants like Kargar
could depend on whether a jurisdiction has a provision covering de minimis
infractions. In Section 2.12, not widely followed by states, which mainly leave
judgments about unharmful behavior to prosecutorial discretion and to sentencing, the
Model Code authorizes a court to dismiss a prosecution if a defendant's conduct did
not cause the harm the law aimed to prevent or involved some other extenuation such
that one cannot think the legislature envisaged it.' 0 The way this language is
formulated, it could help a defendant like Kargar, who relied on cultural tradition to
show he did no real harm. It would not help a defendant who caused some harm
(from the standpoint of the majority's culture) but argued either that his cultural
tradition shows that the harm was less than in the more ordinary context or that he was
much less blameworthy than the typical defendant.
When we turn to recklessness and negligence, matters become more complicated.
Recklessness involves conscious risk creation. According to § 2.02(2)(c), a person
must "consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk ... The risk must be
of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's
conduct ... ,its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that
a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation." Insofar as the issue is
what risks a person actually perceives, analysis is the same as with respect to purpose
and knowledge.
Cultural factors could be introduced to show that a parent did or did not perceive
the risk of failing to take a child with a high fever to the doctor. Although this is not
quite so clear, the actor's perception of the degree of risk is what should count, not an
objective appraisal. If the actor perceives one chance in ten thousand whereas the
actual risk is one in ten, his sense should control evaluation of whether the risk was
substantial.
The determination of what degree of risk is substantial is not left to the actor; that
is decided by the jury. The crucial question about recklessness is what makes a risk
unjustifiable. One asks whether there is a "gross deviation" from how "a law-abiding
person" would perform "in the actor's situation.""
powers and that if he slaps B in the face, B will die. He does not want B to die and regrets that his
slapping B will have that consequence. A slaps B and causes B to have a heart attack; B dies. If that

outcome was from an objective point of view highly unlikely, B could not have been "aware that it (was)
practically certain."
10 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12(2)-(3) (1985).
"

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
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Consider the following hypothetical case. According to the traditions of a
cultural group, boys of fourteen should be exposed to a seriously dangerous
situation-say confronting a wild animal or being exposed to the elements in a remote
location-as part of the process of developing into manhood. The parents who put
their sons in these situations realize that the danger they will die is real, and of the last
one hundred boys in similar situations, two have in fact died.12 If a boy now dies,
have the parents committed reckless homicide?
Let us assume that in the majority culture, everyone would agree that short of
authorizing medical treatment needed to preserve life or health, exposing a child to a
two percent chance of death would be a substantial risk and that it would be clearly
unjustified, a gross deviation from the standard a law-abiding person would observe.
But from the perspective of the minority culture, this rite of initiation is so important,
it justifies the risk. Does "the actor's situation" include his being embedded in the
culture? And are the parents less than "law-abiding person[s]" because they are
willing to take this particular risk? We can see quickly that the Code's standard might
be understood to address this question "objectively" in terms of the values of the
majority culture or to take into account the special perspectives of the minority
culture.
The comment gives us some guidance, but it is of a peculiar sort: "the point is
that the jury must evaluate the actor's conduct and determine whether it should be
condemned."' 3 The Model Code, in other words, does not tell us whether the jury
should treat the parents whose exposed son dies according to the standards of the
general culture or to give weight to the standards of the parents' minority culture. The
Code's language and the comment do strongly suggest, however, that the parents
should be able to present evidence about their cultural traditions and to argue that that
is part of their situation and that they are not less than law-abiding persons.
The issues about negligence are similar to those concerning recklessness.
Negligence does not depend on awareness of risk; it is enough that the actor should
have been aware of a risk. For negligence under the Model Penal Code, the actor's
failure must involve "a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would observe in the actor's situation."' 4 Again, we have a reference to the
actor's situation, which might or might not include his cultural practices. Again, the
Commentary tells us that the jury is to determine if the defendant's failure justifies
condemnation,' 5 and adds that "[t]here is an inevitable ambiguity in 'situation.' 46
Certainly it would matter, it says, if a defendant were blind or had just suffered a
heart attack, but "heredity, intelligence or temperament" would not be material and
12 To shift to the mythical, in Mozart's opera The Magic Flute, part of the significance of the
trials of fire and water is that Tamino and Pamina might actually die.

13 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 237 (1985).
14 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985).
15 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 241 (1985).
16 Id. at 242.
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"could not be without depriving the criterion of all its objectivity."' 7 The issue about
such discriminations is left "to the courts."' 18 If we put these various passages
together, the court is to decide that some claims cannot be offered in respect to
negligence-the standard is not the reasonable angry person-but that for others the
jury is to determine their significance. For me, the language of the negligence
subsection and its commentary sound slightly less promising for evidence of cultural
factors than the analogous passages on recklessness, but I would nevertheless
conclude that defendants typically should be able to argue that cultural traditions are
part of the situation against which negligence should be determined.
C. Justifications
I turn now to two justifications for behavior that would otherwise be criminalself-defense and general justification (or necessity). The Model Penal Code treats9
mistakes about justifying circumstances as matters of justification, not excuse.'
Contrary to the law of most jurisdictions, it correlates culpability about justifying
circumstances to the culpability level of the underlying offense. To take an example,
one form of aggravated assault is purposely or knowingly causing bodily injury with a
deadly weapon.20 If A intends to scare B by shooting near him, but the bullet creases
the flesh of B's leg,21A has not committed this form of assault, even if his assumption
that he would not hit B was unreasonable (negligence), and even if he was aware of a
risk he might hit B (recklessness).
Now, suppose A, acting under an unreasonable belief that B is about to shoot
him, intends to hit B with his shot but without injuring him seriously, and he does
inflict minor injury. In a jurisdiction in which a belief in justifying circumstances
must be reasonable to provide a defense, A would be guilty of this form of aggravated
assault. Under the Model Code he would not, because his culpability about his
possible justification (negligence, or perhaps recklessness) is less than the culpability
level for the underlying offense.22 A negligent belief in justifying facts will, under the
Model Code, provide a defense to a crime of purpose or recklessness, but in most
jurisdictions it will provide no defense at all.
Section 3.04 of the Model Code allows the use of force for self-protection "when
Id.
Id.
19 There is disagreement among theorists whether mistakes about justifying circumstances give
rise to justifications or excuses. I have claimed that when a person has made the best judgment possible
in the situation, but it turns out to be mistaken, he should definitely be viewed as justified. And I have
also defended the Model Code's approach as one among appropriate options. See Kent Greenawalt, The
17

18

PerplexingBorders ofJustificationand Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1897 (1984).
20 MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2)(b) (1985).

21 I have put B's injury so that it is "bodily injury" under the Code but not "serious bodily injury."
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0 (1985).
22 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (1985).
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the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary" to protect himself against
the use of unlawful force.23 Deadly force is justifiable if "the actor believes [it] is
necessary to protect.., against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping," or forcible
sexual intercourse. 24 Section 3.05 contains similar standards for the use of force to
protect third persons.
Consider this fanciful illustration.25 Members of an African tribe that have
moved to the United States believe that witches can cause people to die immediately
by casting certain spells. B, believing he is a witch, begins casting a spell which both
B and A believe will quickly kill A and her family. A shoots B dead. A has believed
that deadly force was immediately necessary to protect herself and others against
death. 6 A is not guilty of purposeful or knowing homicide under the Code, because
she believes she has a justification. But is A is guilty of reckless or negligent
homicide? She is not guilty of reckless homicide unless she was aware of a risk that
the facts did not justify her action. Apart from that problem, we are left with the
question whether her belief was reasonable.
The relevant sections and comments on justification 27 do not provide as full an
account of recklessness and negligence as do the section and commentary on the basic
standards of culpability. 28 The earlier account of what those standards mean is
incorporated for claims of justification. Thus, to take negligence, we are referred to
what a reasonable person would do "in the actor's situation, 29 and to the commentary
that tells us that the jury needs to decide if A's failure justifies condemnation. 30 Here,
A's failure involves a gross mistake about the nature of reality (at least as that is
understood in the majority culture). When a person has killed another based on such a
serious mistake, one strongly doubts that a jury would be inclined to say that she does
not deserve condemnation for the least grave form of homicide, negligent homicide.
And I am inclined to think that a judge could fairly refuse to allow the defense to raise
that claim. 31 If these judgments are correct, one might think that a special cultural
defense would be needed here to exonerate A, but would one conclude that A should
be relieved of liability for even negligent homicide? I doubt it.
Jurisdictions in which belief in justification must be reasonable to count at all
would be much harsher on A's claim in these circumstances. If reasonableness were
assessed according to the majority culture, A would definitely lack a reasonable belief
23

MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985).

24

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 3.04(2)(b)

(1985).

25 This is a variation of a Kongolese case discussed in Claes Lernestedt, CriminalLaw and
Culture,, in CRIMINAL LAW AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY, supra note 3.
26 A minor hurdle is that B's spell must count as unlawful force if it would work.
27

MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04, 3.05, 3.09 and comments (1985).

28

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), (d) and comments (1985).

29

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 241.

30 Id. at 237.
31 Thus, I distinguish this case from the one in which parents risk their son's life in an effort to
help him move towards manhood.
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in justifying facts, and she would be guilty of murder, since she killed purposefully.
For such ajurisdiction, the argument for some special cultural defense (or mitigation)
would seem much more powerful.
The Model Code's general justification defense, in Section 3.02, applies, subject
to some exceptions, if the actor thinks his conduct is necessary to avoid a harm that is
"greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged."
Although the section's language is not entirely clear on the point, the section does
32
justify taking one life if that is necessary to save many. Thus, A, in our witch
hypothetical, might be able to claim that she believed she was avoiding a harm that
was greater than the death of B. If, as Section 3.02 seems to provide, she succeeded in
defending against a prosecution for murder,33 the question would remain whether she
would be guilty of reckless or negligent homicide.
New York's statute, which some other states have followed, gives a general
justification only if "such conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an
imminent public or private injury. . ."34 This standard is decisively objective; if A
makes an unreasonable mistake about justifying circumstances, she has no
justification defense to any crime, and reasonableness is to be determined according to
the dominant perspective about reality.
D. Duressand Mitigationfrom Murder to Manslaughter
Under the Model Code, duress, set out in Section 2.09, is an excuse. We need to
be clear initially about how duress fits with the general justification defense. Some
courts have used duress for all situations in which one responds to human threats by
committing a criminal act, reserving the necessity defense for natural circumstances,
such as a snowstorm that causes a mountaineer seeking shelter to break into someone
else's cabin. Under the Model Code, the general justification defense reaches both
natural emergencies and human threats. If I steal a watch in response to a credible
threat that I will be shot to death if I do not, I have a defense of general justification.
What is left for duress are circumstances in which a person is not actually
justified in responding to a threat but cannot fairly be blamed for yielding. The
formulation covers coercion by force or threatened force "that a person of reasonable
firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. '35 What of a wife who
belongs to a minority culture in which women are expected to do what their husbands
tell them, and who carries heroin on an airplane in response to her husband's threat
that he will beat her if she does not? In the majority culture, a wife of reasonable

32

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 3.02 (1985).

33 One wonders whether a court would really entertain this defense for purposeful murder if a
person said he was complying with God's orders and that killing his victim was immediately necessary to
save multiple lives.
34 N.Y. PENAL LAW, § 35.05 (2008).
35 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1985).
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firmness would not submit.36 But most wives in the minority culture would submit.
The question is whether membership in that culture is part of "her situation." The
commentary refers back to the standards for recklessness and negligence; it tells us
that factors like size, strength, age, and health are relevant, but temperament is not.37
The commentary also indicates that the defense could be available to someone who
was "brainwashed, 38 and the wife might argue that being involved in a minority
culture is analogous to being "brainwashed." As with many of the other sections we
have looked at, this section leaves it to the jury to decide if the threat of force
exculpates, and that judgment is inextricable from how the actor's "situation" is
understood.
Something similar is true about the section that authorizes mitigation of murder
to manslaughter. The Model Code greatly broadened the traditional rule that certain
provocations, a limited number, could warrant reducing intentional killing from
murder to manslaughter. According to Section 210.3(l)(b), a homicide that would
otherwise be murder is reduced to manslaughter if it is "committed under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse." That is to be determined "from the viewpoint of a person in
the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.",39 The
commentary explains that the trier of fact must take the circumstances as the actor
perceives them.4° (However, the commentary does not focus on the circumstance
when the actor's basic view about physical reality is fundamentally distorted, as in the
belief about deadly magic, from the standpoint of the majority culture.)
Assessing the basic facts accurately, a Japanese woman kills her two children and
tries to kill herself because she has been deeply shamed by her husband's infidelity.
Let us assume that that would not provide a sufficient emotional disturbance for which
there is a reasonable explanation or excuse in the majority culture. Might it
nevertheless be such an excuse for a woman raised in a culture in which the
humiliation she suffered would be horrible and would include her children?
The comment provides the familiar line that "situation" is ambiguous.41
Blindness, shock from traumatic injury, and extreme grief would be included in one's
situation, idiosyncratic moral values would not. The language aims for "flexibility,"
allowing argument about what is a reasonable explanation or excuse. 42 "In the end,
the question is whether the actor's loss of self-control can be understood in terms that
arouse sympathy in the ordinary citizen. 43 Given these portions of the commentary,
However, one might argue that being a battered woman is part of one's situation and that the
standard for a woman whose husband beats her should not be wives in general.
37 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. at 375 (1985).
38 Id. at 376-77.
39 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1985).
36

40 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. at 68.
41

Id. at 62.

Id.at 63.
43 Id. The comment does not make clear when a judge may refuse to allow a defendant's claim
42
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the Japanese defendant clearly should be able to argue that she was acting under the
influence of an emotional disturbance that would qualify.
Although the Model Code greatly broadens the circumstances that could allow a
"provocation" mitigation to manslaughter and renders the relevant inquiry
significantly more subjective than it had previously been, the Code lacks any general
diminished responsibility mitigation. A defendant must be able to make an argument
under the sections I have mentioned or other sections of a similar sort.
E. Ignoranceof the Law
One kind of argument that a defendant might offer is that his cultural traditions
left him unaware that his behavior was criminal. Kargar, for example, would not have
assumed that kissing the penis of his son was actually a criminal act in the state of
Maine. 44
The common law's traditional harshness about ignorance of the law is captured
by the phrase, "Ignorance of the law is no excuse." What is meant in this respect is
ignorance about the law defining an offense, not every mistake about what the law
provides. Suppose a woman breaks off an engagement, removing her engagement
ring and placing it on a table in her apartment. Her fianc6 mistakenly thinks he then
becomes the legal owner of the ring he gave her months earlier. His taking of the ring
is not theft. Given his mistake about the law of property, he has not knowingly taken
the property of another.
The Model Code continues the tradition of not excusing ignorance of the relevant
penal law, but it creates two exceptions. Section 2.04(3)(b) concerns people who rely
on reasonable official statements about the law's content-not likely to be much help
for recent immigrants from diverse cultural traditions. Section 2.04(3)(a) covers
situations in which the law is "not known to the actor and has not been published or
reasonably been made available." The language about "published" or "made
available" focuses on general availability, not on whether people in subgroups of
society had an adequate opportunity to be aware of the law.
The comment does say that "[tihere can be no point in punishing someone who
neither knows his behavior is criminal nor has that information reasonably available to
him. 45 But the comment acknowledges that the Code's language does not protect
defendants who had no reason to suppose that a mere failure to register might be
criminal, a situation in which the Supreme Court had discerned a constitutional
defense. 46 Before suggesting that a broadened defense might lead to spurious claims
and reduce incentives to learn the law, the comment remarks, "A legislative
broadening of the defense to excuse all those who could not reasonably be expected to
that she qualifies under this section to be put to the jury.
44 State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81 (Me. 1996).
45 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 cmt. at 276 (1985).
46 The Supreme Court held that such a defendant had a due process right not to be convicted in
Lambert v. California,355 U.S. 225 (1957).
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be aware of a law's existence would bar conviction in some cases that are not reached
by the Code's language but in which liability may seem unjust. '47 (Except for a few
provisions as to which prevailing sentiment had radically altered, this is about as close
as the comments get to criticizing formulations in the Code.) Such a broadening
would give a foothold for claims of recent immigrants that they could not be expected
to be aware of laws, but the comment is clear that Section 2.04 as it stands does not
provide a defense in these cases.
IV. A GENERAL CULTURAL DEFENSE-EXCUSE OR MITIGATION

Is there any need for a general cultural defense that would allow the introduction
of cultural traditions to excuse defendants or mitigate their liability? The argument
for such a defense is much weaker for the Model Code than for jurisdictions with
more objective standards of recklessness and negligence, with requirements that all
justifications be reasonable, and with narrower standards for duress and provocation.
We saw in connection with Kargarthat the definitions of specific crimes are also
important. If definitions are exclusively in terms of physical acts that may have vastly
different significance among different cultural groups (and if a jurisdiction lacks a de
minimis provision), there may be more need for a special cultural defense than if
crimes are defined more flexibly in terms of antisocial purposes.
In the most extensive treatment of a cultural defense, Alison Dundes Renteln has
suggested that defendants should be able to introduce cultural traditions to be
considered by judges and juries when that might lead someone to believe their actions
are excused or less culpable.48 As it stands, this proposal suffers two serious flaws: a
lack of clarity about just how the defense is supposed to work, and inattention to how
this proposed defense might relate to other proposed defenses.
The first point is fairly easy to understand now that we have run through some
major provisions of the Model Code. A penal code has general principles, definitions
of specific crimes, and provisions for sentencing. Sentencing in the United States is
(with the exception of capital punishment) generally left to judges. I am assuming,
without examining precise schemes of sentencing, that cultural traditions could be
relevant at sentencing, whether they suggest lower or higher penalties for a defendant.
But how is the general cultural defense to work at trial? Juries rendering verdicts
decide whether defendants are guilty of crimes with which they are charged.
Sometimes juries may determine that defendants are guilty of lesser included
offenses-a man charged with murder may be guilty only of manslaughter, a woman
charged with grand larceny may be guilty only of petit larceny. 49 Ajury may excuse a
defendant who acted under duress. It may choose to nullify the law by acquitting
someone who it believes is guilty of the crime charged.
47

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 cmt. at 276 (1985).

48 See ALISON DuNDEs RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE (2004).

49 The prosecution may fail to prove that jewelry she stole was worth the amount required for
grand larceny.
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But, and here is the point, criminal codes confer no power on juries or judges
simply to reduce the level of offenses based on a sense that the defendant is less
culpable then the typical defendant charged with that species of crime. For homicide,
the provocation defense and its expanded Model Code counterpart do allow a
reduction in the category of crime from murder to manslaughter; so also does the yet
more general "diminished responsibility" defense for jurisdictions that recognize that
defense. But the law contains no similar defenses for crimes of larceny, rape, and
selling proscribed drugs. If cultural evidence does not show that a defendant lacked
the basic culpability as prescribed in the offense, or that he acted under duress, or that
his crime was de minimis, what is the jury to do if the evidence leads it to conclude
that the defendant was less culpable than the typical offender? It is called upon to
render a verdict of guilty or not guilty for the crime charged. Of course, it is free to
acquit in the face of convincing evidence of guilt, but Professor Renteln seems to have
in mind something more subtle than cultural evidence producing jury nullification. °
A jury might use cultural evidence to reduce the level of offense in a way not
authorized by the criminal code-what we might consider a qualified form of
nullification. Thus, assume that a woman has stolen $100,000 worth of diamonds.
The jury, after hearing cultural evidence that makes her appear relatively sympathetic,
convicts her only of petit larceny.
A simple proposal to allow evidence and argument about why cultural practice
should reduce liability, even when it does not bear on the elements of a crime,
founders on the problem of its relevance for what a jury must actually decide. I see
only two ways out of this bind. One is to provide that for specific defenses with
which we are familiar, cultural factors could relieve a defendant of liability, with the
reference to cultural factors supplementing the more general formulation of the
defenses. Thus, a criminal code could make reasonable ignorance of the law an
excuse for a recent immigrant with a cultural background that differs significantly
from that of the majority culture. That would then be a special added ignorance of
law defense, limited only to cultural claims.
The second strategy would be to adopt a more general provision for cultural
factors along the lines of:
(1) When a defendant's conduct is grounded in minority cultural traditions
in such a way that his behavior is excusable, though not covered by
any specific excuses, he shall not be guilty.
(2) When a defendant's conduct is grounded in minority cultural traditions
in such a way that his behavior is less culpable than is typical for an
offense, he shall be guilty of a lesser offense (to whatever degree the
jury deems appropriate), whether or not the definitions of specific
offenses make such factors relevant.

50

See generally RENTELN, supra note 48.
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Either of these two approaches raises the question why cultural traditions should
be treated differently from other factors that might reduce culpability, but do not
connect to the basic elements of offenses in their standard formulations, such as
violently abusive parents, dire poverty, growing up as a member of a neighborhood
gang, brain damage, or a genetic predisposition to violent action. Someone with any
of these disadvantages might claim that he is less culpable than the typical offender.
One might answer that recognizing cultural factors would be less threatening to
the overall deterrent objectives of the penal law or would be less subject to spurious
claims than allowing these other factors to reduce culpability. Perhaps it matters that
minority cultures form kinds of communities with their own norms and sanctions,
ones that, unlike the norms and sanctions within gangs, may not in general be
opposed to the basic norms of the dominant culture. I shall not try to engage the
inquiry comparing cultural and other factors in detail here, but I do want to stress that
a component of any plausible argument for a general cultural defense, conceived
mainly as involving excuse and mitigation, must be an explanation of why a
connection to an ethnic or national minority culture should to be treated differently
from other bases for arguments that a defendant's culpability is reduced. Of course,
one might instead build from these cultural factors to conclude that other factors
should be similarly treated, but then one would end up recommending reforms that
would be much broader than introducing a general cultural defense or an explicit
cultural defense supplement to existing defenses.
In concentrating on how the structure of defenses in the Model Penal Code
relates to the possibility of a general cultural defense, I have slighted important
aspects of the problem that deserve mention, however brief. The need for a specific
defense (or specific additions to existing defenses) may seem greater if the sentencing
discretion of judges is constrained. Adopted in a different era, the Model Code
embodied highly discretionary, flexible, sentencing; that approach has been rejected in
the United States in favor of a model in which guidelines sharply reduce discretion,
and, therefore, variations among sentences. The need to recognize relevant factors in
the substantive criminal law is more pressing if they cannot be given due weight in
sentencing.
A serious difficulty with creating a specific cultural defense is the burden it
would place on judicial administration. Judges would need to determine exactly what
kinds of factors could be "cultural" in the right sense and which of these might
plausibly bear on culpability. (Otherwise, a judge should not allow such evidence to
go to ajury.) The judge would then have to decide how much evidence to allow about
cultural traditions and practices and about whether a defendant was himself or herself
connected to those traditions and practices in the necessary way.
A member of an ethnic minority, even one who engages in particular practices of
that culture, may not regard those practices as including norms he should follow if he
has reasons to act otherwise.5 ' If a defendant was a member of a minority with
Samuel Scheffler, Immigration and the Significance ofCulture, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 98, 11924 (2007). Scheffler, points out that not all aspects of "cultures" carry normative authority for members.
51
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distinctive practices, but had lived in the United States for more than a decade and had
developed an attitude of indifference to those practices, he should not be able to claim
successfully that he was constrained by culture to engage in the particular practice that
constituted the criminal act for which he was prosecuted; but a judge would be hard
put to identify this attitude of indifference at the outset and he would have difficulty
deciding just how much evidence to allow about the defendant's degree of adherence
to cultural norms. (A judge under the Model Penal Code already faces somewhat
similar questions about what evidence to allow about a defendant's "situation" under
the various provisions where that is relevant, but she need not worry about the specific
boundary lines of (relevant) culture.)
Three more general concerns reach beyond these worries about practical
implementation. People, especially people who emigrate to a country with a different
culture, have a range of choice about what to accept and reject, and immigration itself
often, though not always, signals rejection of aspects of the culture from which the
immigrant comes.52 The "melting pot" tradition (or myth) in the United States
assumes that immigrants of highly diverse traditions will absorb the general culture.
However benighted this tradition may be about broad cultural diversity, perhaps we
should think of those who come to the country as free enough to conform with basic
criminal standards. And often the victims of crimes for which there is a cultural
explanation may be members of the minority culture who themselves have rejected
the norms that guide the actors who harm them. Finally, decisions by judges or juries
that an actor is less culpable because he was behaving in accord with cultural practices
of his minority may be regarded as regrettable stereotyping by other members of the
same minority who disagree about what their cultural practices and norms have been
or who have come to reject as long outmoded the practices on which the defendant has
relied.
V. A GENERAL CULTURAL DEFENSE OR EXEMPTION:
A CONCEPT OF JUSTIFIED ACTION

In some circumstances, the claim about cultural tradition is that members of the
majority culture should recognize that people have a right to act according to their
cultural practices, even if this contravenes ordinary legal standards. One might think
of this as one form of a claimed right to one's culture. Thus, Kargar argued on appeal
that he had a constitutional right to kiss his son's penis (although he later did not
claim he should be allowed to continue the practice).53 I have already discussed the
possibility of specific exemptions for conduct that is required or encouraged by
cultural traditions. Undoubtedly, such exemptions are sometimes warranted. The
question here is the possibility of a general exemption-that is, an exemption cast in

12

See id. at 99-103.

53 RENTELN, supra note 48, at 245 nn.53 & 55. No claim of constitutional right is addressed by
the court's opinion.
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terms of a general formula to be applied by administrators, judges, or juries on a caseby-case basis.
One inquiry along these lines is to ask how cultural traditions relate to religious
traditions. That inquiry is not the only analogy one might choose in thinking about
justified behavior, 54 but it has special interest because of the overlap of religions and
cultures and because the law in many American jurisdictions does provide a general
exemption-limited in scope as it may be-for religious practices.55 Although the
circle of religious practices intersects with the circle of cultural practices, some
cultural practices are not religious (or not religious enough) and many religious
practices do not attach to minority cultures. If a general exemption for religious
practices is warranted, as much American law now assumes, should practices of
minority cultures that members take as having normative force, but are not religious
(enough), be treated similarly?
We can illustrate this issue in light of a recent Supreme Court decision upholding
the right of a small Brazilian religious group to import a hallucinogenic tea used in
worship.56 Suppose a cultural group had a strong nonreligious tradition that that tea
should be used in family celebrations. Should members have a similar right, or at
least have their claims to drink the tea assessed by standards similar to those used for
the religious group?
In this brief discussion, I shall omit constitutional arguments that religion must
be, or may be, given a special status. And by assuming that some cultural traditions
are not religious (enough), I shall disregard the rich variety of connections between
cultural practices and religion, which can present formidable difficulties in
determining whether a particular practice should count as a form of religious
exercise.57
A brief amount of legal history and explication is needed to set our inquiry in
context. In 1963, the Supreme Court decided that a Seventh Day Adventist could not
be denied unemployment compensation because she was unwilling to work on
Saturday, her Sabbath.58 It indicated more generally that, under the Free Exercise
Clause, the government could not impinge on religious practices unless it had a
compelling interest that could not be accomplished by less restrictive means. 59 Using
that approach the Court later held that Amish families could withdraw children from

54 One might, for example, consider how justifications arising out of familiar contact sports might
relate to cultural practices.
5 I am particularly interested in this comparison because some of my recent work has focused on
free exercise exemptions. See 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTTrUTION: FREE EXERCISE
AND FArRNEs (2006); 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITION: ESTABLISHMENT AND
FAIRNEsS (2008).
56 Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espfiita Beneficente Unido do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (applying
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
57 For my views about "defining religion," see 1 GREENAWALT, supra note 55, at 124-56.
58 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
'9

Id. at 406-08.
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school at the age of fourteen to undertake community vocational education, despite a
state law requiring schooling until the age of sixteen. 6°
For these constitutional exemption cases, the language of "compelling interest"
was always a bit misleading. That language was drawn from cases involving racial
discrimination and legislative measures that curtailed freedom of speech. In those
cases, it was very difficult for the government to establish a sufficient interest. By
contrast, when religious claimants sought to be free of regulations that validly applied
against everyone else, the showing of interest the government needed to make was
less.
In 1990, the Supreme Court withdrew this protection as a matter of constitutional
right for almost all areas. 6' If a law was neutral in respect to religion and of general
application, that was essentially the end of the inquiry. 62 Thus, no matter how
important peyote was for worship services of the Native American Church, members
had no right to disregard a general ban on the use of peyote.63 Congress responded by
adopting a Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), explicitly incorporating a
standard meant to track the constitutional test of the unemployment compensation and
Amish schooling cases. 64 The Supreme Court subsequently declared this law invalid
as it applied to states and localities, 65 but RFRA still restricts actions of the federal
government. Congress has since adopted a more limited law covering land use and
prisons that does apply to states. 66 A number of states have adopted their own
RFRAs, and some state courts continue to apply the compelling interest standard as
interpretations of their own state free exercise clauses. In sum, a standard like that in
RFRA applies to a significant range of situations in American jurisdictions.
The crucial language of RFRA is this: "Government shall not substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability... [unless] it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that... interest.'67 Among the circumstances to which
this act, and its state analogues, could apply are criminal prosecutions of people who
use proscribed drugs in worship services, who withdraw their children from school,
who violate humane slaughter laws, or who refuse to serve on juries. Obviously this
language will not help people who commit intentional homicides or inflict serious
physical harm; the government has a compelling interest in preventing that behavior.
RFRA and its analogues already protect those traditional practices of cultural
60 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
6' Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
62 Id. at 879-82.
63

Id. at 890.

64 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2006).
65 City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

66 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5

(2006).
67

Id. § 2000bb-1 (a)-(b) (2006).
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minorities that are themselves religious. Should the act be extended to reach
nonreligious minority cultural practices, so that the government may not
"substantially burden a person's exercise of practices within a minority cultural
tradition of which he is a part" unless it satisfies the (weak version of the) compelling
interest test?
An argument in favor of this result is that such a right would go some distance
toward recognizing equality among cultural traditions and would properly
accommodate minority traditions when that could be done without serious cost to the
general society. But there are some obvious difficulties. Exactly what would count as
a minority culture? How attached would a person have to be to the minority culture in
which he was raised? Insofar as the law is trying to shift people away from cultural
practices that do not fit well with the majority culture, should it have to rest on "a
compelling interest," even a watered down compelling interest?
Another objection, often made as to any general cultural defense, could be raised
here. The government should be protecting members of the minority culture,
especially women, who are being treated unfairly and who may want protections they
do not get within that culture. In response to this objection, it may be said that the
government will have a compelling interest in protecting such victims. Thus whatever
excuses their oppressors might have, a kind of RFRA extended to cultural practices
would not give rights to oppress women and children. This response is adequate for
most circumstances in which woman and children might be victims, but it does not
quite answer every situation. Most courts have supposed that religious organizations
have a right to discriminate by gender in choosing their leaders. Would one wish to
confer such a privilege on nonreligious organizations of traditional cultural groups?
That seems debatable.68
Extension of federal and state RFRAs to cover nonreligious minority cultural
practices would have relatively little practical effect in respect to criminal
prohibitions. That is, it would not privilege many activities that are now made
criminal. Its symbolic effect might be welcomed or not, depending on one's overall
views about multiculturalism. Probably its main practical significance would be in
areas of law other than criminal law.
My "on balance" view at this point is that such an extension would not be a good
idea, but I believe the comparison with religious claims, and also with nonreligious
claims of conscience (protected by some laws), is one fruitful perspective for thought
about justifying acts based on cultural practices.69

68 Under present First Amendment law regarding freedom of association, an expressive
association would have a plausible constitutional argument that such discrimination is protected.
69 For such thought, personality disorders and parental abuse are inapposite comparisons, since no
one believes such factors should actually underlie privileges to act.
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VI. CONCLUSION

We have seen that how cultural traditions and practices should figure in criminal
law defenses is a complex inquiry. One can make an argument for creating a general
privilege to rely on the norms of minority cultures if that does not impair significant
state interests, an analogue to the treatment of religion in a number of American
jurisdictions. And one can make an argument for a general defense that could
eliminate or reduce liability for acts that are not actually privileged. Just how
persuasive this latter argument is depends on a number of factors: how crimes are
defined; ordinary standards of culpability, excuse, and justification; a feasible
assignment of roles to judges and juries; and the potentiality to expand existing
defenses by particular references to cultural practices.
My own assessment is that a general privilege for cultural practice along the lines
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act would not be desirable, and that, at least in
jurisdictions whose criminal law resembles that of the Model Penal Code, clarification
and expansion of existing defenses that allow culture to be taken into account is a
more promising strategy than the creation of a general cultural defense. Unlike a
general cultural defense, such a strategy does not encourage (to the same degree)
defenses based on cultural traditions sharply opposed to the values of the dominant
society; it does not require judges to draw somewhat arbitrary lines between cultural
factors that count and those that do not; and it does not entail all the problems of
evidence and stereotyping involved in establishing what is an accurate portrayal of
minority cultural practices and a defendant's attachment to those practices.7 °

70 Of course, these drawbacks are present if the addition to a specific existing defense, such as
ignorance of law, itself makes reference to minority cultural traditions. But then the drawbacks are
contained to limited defenses as opposed to the sweeping coverage of a general cultural defense.

